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Judicial Overkill

THE CAMPUS AND THE COURTS
By Robert M. O'Neil

T ihe
ihe summer respite on the campuses following

Cambodia and Kent State is now behind us. The academ-

judicial decree, and the Miami administration was

prospect that the pressure to close may even come from

preparing to reopen that campus the following Monday
and did not need a judge to stiffen its resolve. The two
injunctions were not so much erroneous as gratuitous.
These developments are not as harmless as they may
at first appear, for the precedent is a dangerous one. A
brief review of three pending lawsuits will suggest the

the courts.

deeper hazards in litigating such issues of campus

Resort to judicial authority, however, may not in
the long run serve the best interests of the university.

governance and responsibility.
The administration of Washington University in St.

application of the laws of the land remain at the heart of
the democratic process, sufficient evidence is at hand to

claiming a denial of their educational and political rights
during the disturbances this past spring.
A group of students, faculty members and student

ic community waits to see whether universities may
again be closed down during the year, and, if so, who

will close them- students, politicians, state police or

National Guard. For the first time there is a serious

While the appropriate use of the courts and the

suggest that use of an outside arbitrator has already
endangered traditional academic autonomy. More important, many administrators believe that legal action will
accomplish what they themselves are unable to do, ie.t
keep the peace on campus, not realizing the price they
have begun to pay for turning to the courts. For the

growing number of lawsuits involving colleges and
universities has given to the courts a new role of
academic decision-making.
Consider the ironic pairing of two court cases during
the week of the Cambodian invasion. On the afternoon

Louis is being sued for over $7 million by students

organizations at Ohio State have been sued for $1

million on similar grounds.
A comparable suit is pending against the president

and regents of the University of Minnesota, though
without an accompanying money damage claim.
All three suits reflect the dissatisfaction of politically conservative students with unsettled campus conditions. In the Ohio State case, the plaintiffs are seeking
recovery from other students and faculty members who,

they say, created these conditions; in the other two

of May 4, the Court of Common Pleas granted the

cases, the litigants are pressing charges against admini-

Prosecuting Attorney of Portage County, Ohio, an order
indefinitely closing the Kent State campus in the wake
of the killing of four students by National Guardsmen.

Specifically, the Washington University suit alleges that
the chancellor failed to call the police to restore order at

Three days later, a group of students obtained an

injunction forcing the University of Miami (Florida) to
reopen doors that had been closed in the aftermath of

the Kent State deaths. Both orders were granted

immediately, without time for careful judicial inquiry.

Thus, Kent State remained closed under court mandate while Miami remained open under a similar decree.

One would have to know much more about the

precise facts and the legal allegations to judge whether
either the Ohio or the Florida court erred in issuing its

order. But undoubtedly the Kent State authorities
would have closed the campus themselves without a

Robert M. O'Neil is professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley and counsel for the Assembly on University

Goals and Governance.

strators who, they claim, condoned such conditions.

certain troubled times; the Minnesota complaint contends that the administration allowed the use of campus
facilities by groups advocating such crimes as fornication
and sodomy, while failing to protect campus access for

agencies such as the FBI, ROTC, and Army and Navy
Intelligence.

Both the Washington University and Ohio State
cases focus directly on the "reconstitution" of classes
this spring. The former attacks Washington's chancellor
for suggesting that academic departments might wish to
relax requirements for completing the year's work. The
Ohio complaint originally named a senior faculty member (since dropped from the suit on technical grounds)

who made a campus speech attacking the rules of
student conduct on the day before the Cambodia
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invasion. Several teaching assistants among the defendants are charged with participating in the same rally

and helping to create an atmosphere conducive to

Apart from disorder and reconstitution cases, other
kinds of university conflicts are finding their way to
court. In New York a group of Long Island University

disorder.

students, unhappy about not being sufficiently con-

Two premises underlie these suits. The first carries a
rather naive assumption: that the courts can somehow
maintain or restore order on a deeply troubled campus
when the administration and even the police have failed.

sulted in the process of selecting their new chancellor,
sought a court injunction to block his taking office. The
suit was dropped by mutual consent when the trustees
agreed to increase student participation in university

The other premise-not the least bit naive-is that the

governance.

president or chancellor, having so failed, may be liable
for heavy damages for his inability to keep the peace.
Thus the plaintiffs seek, in effect, to have it both ways.

At Madison, Wisconsin, this spring, shortly before a
teaching assistants' strike, a group of TA's filed suit to
gain access to English department meetings from which
they had previously been barred. The judge suggested
that the department reconsider, at an open meeting, the
decision that precipitated the suit. The department then
decided to make future meetings open, thus mooting the

A

A Vs a matter of law, the prospect of actual recovery
in these cases seems quite remote. The courts have never
really recognized anything like a "property" right to an
uninterrupted higher education. Whatever contractual

claim there might be is usually qualified either by
cautionary language in the college catalogue or by
conditions beyond the control of the administration that
would temporarily excuse full performance. Moreover,
so long as the student receives academic credit and (in
due course) his degree, the bare contract has presumably
been fulfilled anyway. Even if a substantial breach could
be proven, the measure of damages would probably not

exceed a share of the tuition and fees paid by the

student or his parents, a share reflecting the period of
the interruption.

The only remaining theory of recovery is that of
tort- the branch of the law which redresses a wide range
of negligent or willful wrongs. Before one can recover
for the consequences of another's default, he must first

show some legal duty that has been breached. The
nature of the obligation involved here is at best

uncertain. If a student suffers physical injury through

the negligence of university officials-in a chemistry
laboratory, on the athletic field, or even on a university-

sponsored excursion- he may recover damages against
the persons he proves to have been at fault, or against

the institution itself. Perhaps some analogy could be

drawn between physical injury suffered in this way and
the consequences of an interrupted spring quarter. But
the degree of culpability is manifestly different: is the
chancellor legally liable for failure to call the police in
the same way he is accountable for not repairing broken
stadium seats or for hiring a careless bus driver?
Some observers have suggested that a constitutional

claim might be advanced. But while the courts have
begun to develop legal safeguards for the constitutional
rights of college students, the pertinent decisions protect

only against denial of educational opportunities on
arbitrary or discriminatory grounds- e.g., because a

student happens to be black, or Catholic, or a member
of SDS (or YAF, for that matter). They do not ensure
against interruption of a student's education because of
the political activities of his fellow students.

40

lawsuit.

Last fall and winter, the Tufts University community in Medford, Massachusetts, sought a court decision
on the bitterly divisive issue of minority employment in

the construction of new campus buildings. Although
both sides agreed to abide by the judicial decision, the
Superior Court ultimately declined jurisdiction and left
the matter to the litigants.

One may easily forget that litigation is a weapon
which cuts both ways. In recent months faculty and
student groups at the universities of Kentucky, Kansas
and Denver have filed suits to enjoin the further use of
National Guardsmen on their campuses under nonemer-

gency conditions. The parents of at least two of the

students killed at Kent State have brought death actions
against the university officials. Similar suits will very
likely be filed on behalf of the two students killed at
Jackson State College. The extensive searching of dormitory rooms at Kent State after the May 4 tragedy is also
being challenged in court. And faculty members at Kent
State may seek an injunction against further surveillance
of their courses and interrogation of their students by
the FBI and other law enforcement agents.
Countersuits of this kind do not serve to correct the

balance. They are at best crude weapons to be used

after-the-fact-after someone has been killed on campus,
after residence halls have been ransacked, after Guardsmen have held the campus in a state of siege. Such legal
recourse is essential, for without it vital interests would

go unprotected. But these suits do not solve the basic
problems, and they may encourage encroachment on
campus autonomy.
Resort to litigation serves to legitimize a potentially

dangerous practice. One can only caution against its

excessive use. Undoubtedly, there will be much more of
this sort of litigation in the months ahead. But it may
very well limit some crucial options, rather than widen
them. The danger to institutional autonomy is clearest in

the suits involving money damages brought against
university officials. However unlikely the prospect of
recovery may be, the threat clearly constricts, and may
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distort, the exercise of administrative judgment at the
very time when campus officials need greater flexibility
and broader scope in dealing with campus unrest. The
university president who fears a lawsuit if he fails to call
the police may make the wrong choice simply because
he is reasonably sure he will not be sued if he does call
the police.
The risks are less obvious in other kinds of cases.

Yet, even in the routine petition for an injunction
against actual or threatened disorder, the campus that
turns routinely to the courts has really chosen preservation of integrity over autonomy. The mere delegation of
a range of internal questions to an external authorityone which is not accountable to any internal pressures

and which is not fully cognizant of the institution's
needs- creates dangerous precedents. For not only the
issues initially assigned to the court but many others as

well may eventually pass beyond the control of the
campus. And the intervention of civil authorities is more
likely when the courts are asked to issue a restraining

order that only the police can enforce and only the

court can interpret.

At the same time, there is another growing danger:
that increasing resort to the courts will cause the internal

decision-making and conflict-resolving channels of a
university to atrophy. If alternative external forums are
readily available, the pressure to compel a university to
put its own house in order may be removed at the very
time such pressure is most vital.

which the recent suits rest is that a court of law can

define the duties and responsibilities of a university
president in time of turmoil with the same precision that

it can determine when proper care has not been

exercised in maintaining the buildings and grounds.

There is at least one hopeful sign that courts

recognize the need for restraint in this complex, sensitive

area. Late in June the Federal Court of Appeals in
Washington, D.C., declined to apply antitrust or constitutional law principles to an accreditation dispute
between Marjorie Webster Junior College (a small proprietary institution in Washington) and the Middle States
Association. Middle States holds that proprietary colleges are prima facie ineligible for membership.

The Marjorie Webster case suggests that courts are
becoming aware of the risks of entering the "academic
thicket." In the Court of Appeals, for example, eleven
professional and accrediting organizations filed friend-ofthe-court briefs backing Middle States. Some defended
the particular standard of exclusion involved. Others,
including the American Bar Association, the Association
of American Law Schools and the American Association
of University Professors, dealt only with the appropriate
standard of judicial review. The latter groups argued that
courts should tread warily in a field where judicial expertise and precedent are lacking, and where the consequences of broad intrusion are difficult to estimate.

The court, of course, might well have reached the
same conclusion without any advice from these inter-

ested non-parties. But the participation of so many

Q

^Superficially, many comparable questions might be
raised by lawsuits seeking reinstatement of persons
dismissed from the university. But the university is not
threatened as seriously by legal challenges to student
discipline and faculty dismissals. Such lawsuits rely on
familiar constitutional doctrines to support the plain-

tiffs claims to procedural due process or substantive
civil liberties. When a court holds that a university rule
violates the First Amendment, it performs a task similar
to that of reviewing allegedly repressive policies of any
other agency or body. There is no chance to probe the
inner workings of the university or to call university
officials to testify. Nor is there any need to substitute

the judgment of a court for the wisdom and the

expertise of men who govern the university.

Thus the disruption-reconstitution cases really begin
where the reinstatement cases leave off. The essence of

the charge in such cases as those against Ohio State, the
University of Minnesota and Washington University is
that the president or chancellor made an unwise choice
among a range of legally permissible options. The court

can decide such a question only by reviewing the

professional academic groups is significant. It suggests

both the depth of concern for the judicial role in
complex academic controversies and a way of urging

caution upon courts faced with such issues.
Whether or not the courts deal with such cases, the
issues that generate them will surely persist. For it is

clear that judicial intervention will not remove the
problems that divide and disrupt campuses. It is equally
clear that judicial abstinence will not bring peace to the
campus. If the courts decline to intercede, responsibility
for solving internal conflicts will revert to the campus,

where it belongs. One last effort must be made to
develop on-campus tribunals that can resolve issues

which are now increasingly relegated to external forums.

Rather than going to the courts, cannot campus

problems be solved on campus with comparable integrity
and vastly greater expertise? Of course, campus decisions

may not always be obeyed. But neither may court
orders, as the number of recent contempt proceedings
suggests.

The inherent advantages of trying to utilize every
available campus mechanism are substantial. The hazards

of surrendering academic control to external consti-

judgment and the discretion of the administration on
matters that require a high level of expertise -and on

tuencies are great enough without the university's adding
its own self-inflicted wounds. As the situation is now

which, given the nature of the times, a wide margin
(even for error) must be allowed. Yet the theory on

direction.

progressing, we may well be headed rapidly in the wrong
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